A tester actively attempts to compromise a defined target — demonstrating exploitability and building attack chains that a scanner cannot see.
A time-bounded, scope-bounded, authorized attempt to exercise the security of a defined target by performing the actions an attacker would perform — identifying vulnerabilities, demonstrating their exploitability, and producing actionable findings.
| It is not … | Because … |
|---|---|
| Vulnerability scanning | Scanning identifies; pentesting exploits and chains. A scan is one input, not the engagement. |
| Red teaming | Red team simulates a goal-driven adversary against the whole org, including detection & response, often covertly. Pentest is more bounded. |
| A complete security assessment | Scope is always bounded. A pentest of the web app says nothing about the internal Active Directory. |
| Proof of security | "We found nothing exploitable within scope, in the time we had, with the skills we brought." That is all. |
| "Hacking with permission" | The discipline is phases, evidence standards, and reporting expectations — most of which have nothing to do with the attack itself. |
Phases overlap in practice: post-exploitation reveals new targets; reporting starts in parallel with exploitation.
A typical commercial engagement combines two or three, e.g. "external web app + external infrastructure."
| Reference | Best used for |
|---|---|
| PTES | Engagement lifecycle and high-level technique guidance |
| OSSTMM 3 | Measurement-oriented; repeatability and comparability |
| NIST SP 800-115 | Accessible US-federal reference; widely cited in compliance contexts |
| OWASP WSTG | Web applications — the dominant test-case reference |
| BSI Studie | Classification axes; German-speaking client context |
Calibrating these expectations belongs in the pre-engagement conversation — and in the report's framing section.
| Duration | Typical scope | What it produces |
|---|---|---|
| 1–3 days | Very small or single target | Mostly scanning + validation; rarely finds chained impact |
| 1–2 weeks | Single application or moderate infra | Common commercial size; can produce real exploitation chains |
| 3–6 weeks | Larger scope, multiple apps, internal AD work | Deep coverage; identifies systemic weaknesses |
| Several months | Very large scopes or red team / TIBER-EU | Full adversary simulation with detection in scope |
Part III (Topics 14–18) takes penetration testing and goes deep on its technical phases:
| Topic | PTES phase deepened |
|---|---|
| Topic 14 — Reconnaissance & enumeration in practice | Intelligence gathering |
| Topic 15 — Exploitation in practice | Exploitation |
| Topic 16 — Privilege escalation (Linux and Windows) | Post-exploitation |
| Topic 17 — Web application testing | Vulnerability analysis + exploitation (web) |
| Topic 18 — Post-exploitation & kill-chain synthesis | Post-exploitation + reporting narrative |
A client says "we want a pentest" but has not specified scope. What pentest types could they mean, and how would you guide them to choose?
Walk them through the BSI axes: external or internal? black/grey/white box? what target — web, infrastructure, AD, cloud? what aggressivity? what must the report contain? "We want a pentest" is a starting point, not a scope. Without these answers, no valid authorization exists, no rules of engagement can be written, and no meaningful deliverable can be defined.
Next: Topic 12 — Red teaming. How pentesting evolves when the adversary is persistent, covert, and goal-driven.